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In the SupreDie C.ourt
of the State of Utah

LIQUOR COKTROL COMMISSION
OF UT~\H,
Plaintiff,
NEW YORK: CASUALTY
pANY, a corporation,

COM-

Intervenor,

Case No.
7738

vs.
C. V. LACK and CHRIS E. ATHAS,
Defendants.

ANSWER BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
CHRIS E. ATHAS

STATEMENT

Before analyzing the complaint, and the theory of
liability claimed to be alleged, we will refer to some general inaccuracies in appellant's Statement of Facts.
The statement (p. 3) that this appeal is "from an
order of the District Court sustaining the defendant
1
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Athas' motion to dismiss plaintiff's con1plaint," 1s not
correct. The appeal is from an order dismissing the complaint of plaintiff.
On the motion of this respondent, to dismiss this
appeal, it has been now settled that this order of dismissal will be construed and applied here as having dismissed the complaint of plaintiff for (1) "failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted," and (2) for
refusal of appellant to furnish a more definite statement, as provided by Civil Rule 12 (e) and as ordered
by the Trial Court. This Court granted appellant's
motion to amend its notice of appeal, so as to cover both
matters.
It is not quite correct, as intimated (p. 4), that this
action was brought prior to the adoption of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
This complaint was filed (R. 11-12) April 24, 1950.
The said Civil Rules went into effect January 1, 1950,
and therefore, had been in effect nearly four months.
The fact is that appellant elected to adopt what has
been referred to in the Federal Court practice as the
"long" form of pleading, instead of what has been referred to as -the "short" form. The complaint, neither in
substance nor in form, pleads a cause as permitted by
Rule 8(a), nor is it in substance or form in accord with
any of the suggested short forms under Rule 84.
The complaint sets forth detailed facts upon which
appellant relies and from which it seeks to have the Court
deduce a theory of legal liability against this respondent.

2
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"\Ve will accept the staten1ent by appellant (p. 4)
that it 1uakes no additional claim on this appeal by reason
of the second count of the cmnplaint, alleging a joint
venture, and we agree that this count adds nothing. We
\rill, therefore, n1ake no further reference to this second
count. In other words, if the decision of the Trial Court
is correct as to the first count of the complaint, we understand that it ·will be considered correct as to the second
count also.
The statement of our position, and as to what we
contended in the Trial Court (p. 5), is erroneous. We did
not, and do not, contend that because 46-0-82 "provides
* * * that a person contracting with the Liquor Control
Commission of Utah to operate a package agency * .* *
must be a 'natural person' * * * that, therefore, no other
kind of 'person' could be held accountable to the Liquor
Control Commission for conversion."
We did claim, and will here claim, that this section
has a bearing upon the meaning to be given the allegations of the complaint, and upon the question of possession or control as an element of conversion; and also,
particularly, upon the point as to whether it is alleged
or can be clailned that the liquor handling involved was
by anyone "acting in the ordinary course of the business
of the partnership" (69-1-10), when it is also alleged that
the partnership business was that of operating a "retail pharmacy" and "drug store," which business is, by
other statutes, registered, licensed and regulated as a
different business entirely. (79-12-1 to 79-12a-14).

3
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Another matter which it may be helpful to notice
is the statement (p. 5) by appellant that the "same rule of
procedure prevails under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as formerly, that is: that facts properly pleaded
in the complaint must be taken as true under the motion
to dismiss."
We agree with this statement of the general rule,
but this rule has limitations and qualifications, some of
which appear to have application here.

Bancroft's Code Pleading, VoL 1, Sec. 173, p. 296:
"Sec. 173. LIMITATIONS OF RULE AS
TO ADMISSIONS BY DEMURRER. - A
demurrer admits only such facts as are issuable
and well pleaded, it does not admit the truth of
an allegation of a conclusion of law, mere deductions or opinions, or matters of law; allegations
which are unnecessary or are contrary to the
facts of which judicial notice is taken; * * * Nor
is any inference of fact which is not presumed or
which may not be reasonably or necessarily inferred from the facts alleged, admitted."
Additional cases in support of the foregoing are
cited under the same section numbers in Bancroft's Code
Pleading, Ten Year Supplement.

State v. Rolio, 71 Utah 91, 262 P. 987, is cited there
by the author in support of the statements above quoted.
The opinion contains this statement:

"* * * and what is judicially known may not
be controverted by pleadings, or made issuable
by them."
4
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The following California ca8es hold that allegations
which are repugnant to what the Court judicially knows
must be ignored.
French v. Senate, 146 Cal. 604,80 P. 1031, 69 L.R.A.

556, ( 1905), i~ a leading case. rrhe Court, at p. 1033,
states the rule as follows:
""Those allegations of a pleading which are
not necessary and which are contrary to the fact
of which judicial notice is taken, are not admitted
by a de1nurrer, but are to be treated as a nullity."

House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control District, 144 P. 2d 389, (1944), cites and follows the French
case.
Sec. 104-25-1 U.C.A. (Session Laws 1951, p. 199),
Provides:
"Courts take judicial notice of the following
facts: * * *
''2. whatever is established by law;
''3. public and private official acts of the
legislative, executive, and judicial departments
of this state and of the United States."
This provision was formerly Sec. 104-46-1 U.C.A., of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
See, also, Warren v. Robinson, 21 Utah 429, 61 P.
28, (1900), where the Supreme Court holds that it may
take judicial notice of matters contained in its own records and file.

Brough v. Ute Stampede Assn. (1943), 142 P. (2)
670.

5
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This case deals with the question as to what matters
of general knowledge the court may, within its discretion, judicially notice. The opinion says:
"As stated in 15 R.C.L. pages 1057, 1058:

'* * * courts should take notice of whatever is or
ought to be generally known, within the limits of
their jurisdiction, for justice does not require that
courts profess to be more ignorant than the rest
of mankind.'"
The points of law, and the other and principal matters of difference, can best be presented under the respondent's points which follow.
It may clarify the general situation somewhat to
state that, as to appellant's three points (p. 6), we do
not dispute the general statement of law, as contained
in Point I, but we do deny its application here, or that the
facts alleged bring this respondent within the Rule
stated.
As to Point II, we admit that 46-0-82, among other
things, is a restriction on the power of the Commission,
but the balance of that point is directed to an issue which
is in no way involved. The complaint affirmatively
shows that appellant made Lack, and not the partnership,
its "vendor," and that he continued to be such in the business in which the loss occurred.
We deny, and, under the last subdivision of our
brief, will refute the conclusion stated as Point III.
We directly challenge the claim of appellant's brief
(p. 9) that it "has alleged conversion by the defendants
of a portion" of liquor, "of the value of $37,805.17."

6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

And, as we cannot be entirely sure that they clai1n
this solely by reason of respondent\; partnership with
Lack in the drug store, but may possibly clailn this by
reason of the allegation as to conversion in Para. 7 (R.
3), we v.ill deal with each of these separately.
POINTS RELIED UPON
L

The Trial Court did not err in sustaining the respondent's motion to dismiss, and dismissing appellant's
complaint on the ground that it did not state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
This, basically, is because:
(a) The recital of conversion, in the complaint (R.
3), is a conclusion of law, and it is not supported, but is
nullified, by the specific facts alleged; and
(b) The claim of conversion, based on the theory of
the partnership relation of Lack with respondent in the
pharmacy, is unsupported, and is unsound in law.
II.

The Trial Court did not err in granting respondent's
motion for a more definite statement based on the ground
that the complaint "is so vague and ambiguous" that respondent "could not reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading," nor in dismissing plaintiff's complaint
for refusal to furnish a more definite statement when so
ordered by the Court.

7
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ANALYSIS OF THE COMPLAINT
Allegations and Theory of liability pleaded:

By three separate lines of allegation the complaint
covers three things. These, briefly, are:

1. The relationship existing by statute and contract between the appellant, Liquor Commission,
and the defendant, Lack, and the relation of both
to the delivery and sale of liquor through the
package agency business.
2.

The relationship between the respondent and

C. V. Lack, as partners in the business of a "retail pharmacy" and "drug store."
3.

Then, the separate and confusing paragraph

7 (R. 3) which presumably attempts to allege
some theory of partnership liability, and also
vaguely suggests some breach of duty on the part
of the individual defendants, Mr. Lack and Mr.
Athas.
1. Allegations as to Package Agency:

These allegations are contained in paragraphs 3, 4,
(R. 1) and 6, (R. 2), and in the contracts pleaded and
incorporated.
Para. 3 alleges the entering into the written agreement by which Lack "was authorized to sell and distribute liquor for the plaintiff pursuant to the provisions of
the Liquor Control Act."

8
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The agreement desig11ates Lack as the "vendor,"
as does the statute, and recites that he is also engaged
in retail n1erchandising as a retail druggist. (R. 10)
This is a recital of a necessary qualification because
46-0-S:2, which authorizes these "package agencies" says,
that appellant n1ay create such "by authorizing persons
engaged in the business of conducting a retail merchandising store to sell at such store in sealed packages liquor
to be furnished by the Commission,***."
The contract then recites respective covenants and
agree1nents to be performed by the appellant and defendant, Lack. The Comn1ission agrees to ''furnish liquor"
for the purpose of the operation of the agency and Lack
agrees to sell it at prices fixed by the Commission and
account to it for the retail prices so fixed. It was agreed
that: "The said package agency shall be carried on and
conducted at the present place of business operated by
the vendor at Brigham Street Pharmacy store located at
East South Temple Street in Salt Lake City, Utah; and
shall be designated as package agency No. 78." Lack
was to receive from the Connnission "a minimum monthly
salary * * * of $1,000.00, and such additional salary" as
the Commission determined.
In par. 4 (R. 1), it is alleged that by the agreement
pleaded, Lack agreed to operate the agency "In that
certain drug store * * * owned by the defendants as a
partnership," etc. The "in" may be a little propaganda,
as the contract, quoted above, says uat the Brigham
Street Pharmacy store." The contract is controlling

9
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as to what it says. And by statute ( 46-0-82) it had to be
in a part of a retail store premises, designated and duly
noticed by the Commission.
Then, para. 6 (R. 2), alleges that between 1945 and
1948 "pursuant to the terms of said agreement, plaintiff

* * * delivered to the defe~dants at the Brigham Street
Pharmacy liquor of the total value of $1,057,763.94 * * *
and that the defendant (Lack) received and took possession of the same, pursuant to the terms and conditions
of said agreement, Exhibit A." That is how all the liquor
was handled and this includes the $37,800.00 worth not
thereafter accounted for.
The use of "defendants" in the first clause, and in
this paragraph which is dealing with the contract between Lack and the appellant, appears likely to be a
typographical error. It has no importance, anyway, in
view of the last clause, that all the liquor was "received"
by and taken into the "possession" of the defendant Lack,
"pursuant" to the contract with him. Any inference of
delivery into the possession of this respondent, or the
partnership, is thus clearly negatived. Any delivery to
the partnership would have been contrary to the contract,
and, of course, a violation of the statute by the appellant
itself, and will not be presumed.
Liability against respondent IS not alleged or
claimed by reason of his having or asserting possession
of any liquor. The partnership is not a defendant, and
so this term "defendants" cannot mean. or include it.

10
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So, too, there is no default by anyone clailned, until
after Lack got possession of the liquor, and it was sold,
and then the default is the failure "to account." (R. 3)

'ye refer now to some of the Liquor Control statutes, for two purposes. One is to aid in the interpretation of the contract and allegations, and the other is to
show that the conduct of Lack indicated by the complaint and atten1pted to be attributed to respondent consists of not acts of sin1ple conversion, as to which one
partner may bind another, so as to make him civilly
liable; but would be acts in violation of statutes, which
make them criminal acts, and for which another partner
would not be generally chargeable.
Sec. 46-0-50 places the responsibility for the distribution and storage and for the delivery of alcoholic beverages upon the Conunission, and under ( r) the governing of the "conduct, management, and equipment of any
premises upon which alcoholic beverages may be sold
* =I= * "
And 46-0-82, supra, after providing, as above stated,
that a liquor package agency must be in a retail store
operated at the premises at which the agency is located,
says:
"The authorization shall be by certificate of
the Commission, and such certificate shall designate the person in charge of such agency who
shall be a 'vendor' under this act. The said person
shall be a natural person and the exact location
and description of the part of the premises
where such liquor rnay be kept and sold shall be
11
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designated in the certificate, and liquor shall not
be kept at any other place than as in the certificate designated."
There is no allegation that any of this liquor was
delivered, received, or kept in any part of the pharmacy
premises other than that "part" designated for the liquor
agency; and, too, it must be presumed that, when the
defendant Lack "received and took possession of" the
liquor in question, he did so in the "part of the premises"
so legally designated.
Under 46-0-244, the violation of any of the liquor
statutes would have resulted in the forfeiture of the
pharmacist and pharmacy licenses of the partnership;
and under 46-0-237, the delivery to or keeping of the
liquor here described in the partnership premises would
have constituted these premises an abatable public
nuisance; and under 46-0-197, and many other provisions
of this statute (see: 46-0-107, 46-0-156, 46-0-157, 46-0157a), if Lack, while acting for this partnership, had
done anything by way of handling this liquor, such would
have constituted a crime. And, further, 46-0-58 expressly
prohibits any person, authorized to sell liquor, to, by
clerk or agent or otherwise·, "sell or furnish liquor in
any other place * * * than as authorized by this act."
Before leaving this first line of allegation, we point
out that, not only is there no allegation that any of this
liquor was kept or sold in "any other place" than that
"designated" by the Commission, but there is no allegation that this respondent was ever in this place, or ever

l2
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had anything to do 'vith the operation of it. If there
could be clailned to be any such, appellant does not
seen1 to rely upon thmn here.
Its point (p. 6) is that respondent is liable, whether
he •'knew of or participated* * *or not."
Like\Yise, there is also no allegation that the partnership was engaged in the operation of this package
agency business, or that it ever received possession of
any of the liquor involved. Far from it, the partnership,
as a distinctly separate line of business is alleged. And,
particularly, there is no allegation that respondent was
a member of any partnership which, "in the ordinary
course of its business," could, or ever did handle this,
or any, liquor, in any way.

--

It is important, also, we think, to point out that Exhibit "B," set up and incorporated in the complaint by
plaintiff, recites that "it is mutually understood that
there is an establishment on said premises used in the
operation of a retail liquor store, and that the equipment
used in its operation is not included or subject to this
sales agreement."
This is the agreement by which the partnership took
over the pharmacy Dec. 13, 1945. (R. 10) And thus, the
partnership did not contemplate the liquor business;
and, also, it is plainly indicated that the, or at least a,
package agency was operated in these premises prior
to the commenceinent of the operation of the pharmacy
by these defendants.
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In this connection, also, this document, Exhibit "B"
(R. 10), also recites that the party who sold the pharmacy to these defendants had, for. some time, operated
this drug store business at that address. It may also be
noted that, as to the portion of the premises designated
for the liquor agency (R. 9), Lack agreed "to keep such
premises open to the public for business purposes" on
each day that the appellant permitted the sale of liquor.
And it also recites, as indicated in the allegation above
referred to, that the "said package agency shall be * * *
conducted at the present place of business * * * at Brigham Street Pharmacy store."
Thus, it is indicated that the conditions as to the
separate portions of the premises used respectively by
the package agency and by the pharmacy were not
changed by the formation of, or during the existence of,
this partnership, nor were these distinctly separately
owned and operated businesses changed. There is no
allegation that they were, and the inferences which may
be fairly drawn are that they were not.
2. Allegation as to the Business of the Partners:

Except for the mention in the allegations just referred to of the Brigham Street Pharmacy in par. 4
(R. 2), and which are put there in explanation of the
contract between the appellant and Lack, and of his right
to so contract, because the package agency was to be in
the "retail store" premises, the only other allegation as
to the business of the partners is contained in par. 5.
This paragraph alleges, in substance, that about Dec.
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13, 19-15, these two defendants entered into an agreement with one Hedrick for the "purchase of the retail
drug store" known as Brigham Street Pharmacy, and
gives the location.
Then (R. 2), "that at all tirnes herein mentioned, the
said defendants owned and operated said Brigham Street
Pharmacy as partners, and shared in the profits and
losses thereof." That is all as to the nature or "the
ordinary course of the business of the partnership" (601-10). N"o connection, whatsoever, between this business
and that of the foregoing package agency business is
anywhere intended.
Yet, this allegation seems to furnish the only basis
for appellant's partnership theory, connecting respondent Athas with the liquor business of appellant and defendant Lack. It seems that from this relationship appellant argues that, what was done by Lack, the "vendor," in receiving or selling liquor, and failing to remit
the receipts therefrom, may be imputed to this partnership in the drug store business. Or that the mere existence of a partnership in one business makes each partner
therein liable for the defaults of the other in any other
separate business undertaking of his.
3. Allegations as to Breach of Duty:

All of the allegations relating to breach of duty or
upon which any liability may be claimed are contained in
para. 7 (R. 3).
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This alleges that between December of 1945 and
March of 1948, the defendarnts "sold and otherwise disposed of liquor belonging to the plaintiff of the retail
value of $37,805.17, for all of which the said defendants
failed, neglected, and refused to account to this plaintiff, and that, therefore, the said defendants wrongfully
converted the value thereof, to-wit: the sum of $37,805.17 to their own use, * * *"
This paragraph follows immediately after the above
quoted direct allegation that Lack, as the package agency
operator, "received and took possession" of all the liquor
including this, and that he did so "pursuant to * * *
said agreement, Exhibit A." That could not, of course, be
as a drug store operator.
And it cannot be claimed, that this or any allegation referring to "defendants" is an allegation that
charges the partnership as such . Such references can
have no relation whatsoever to appellant's theory of
partnership liability of respondent. The partnership is
not a "defendant" at all. So this allegation actually
says only that the liquor was delivered to Lack at the
pharmacy location.
Now, let's see if any more can be claimed for the use
of "defendants" in par. 7 (R. 3), that "defendants sold
and otherwise disposed of" the mentioned portion of all
the liquor received by Lack~ We think not.
First, to get its partnership theory of liability to attach to this respondent, plaintiff must get the partnership into the liquor handling "business." This appellant
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does not attempt to do, and this allegation ha.s no tendency to do it, because "defendants" cannot 1nean the
partnership.
Secondly, the ~ale and delivery is neither by this
allegation, nor by the cmnplaint nor by plaintiff's brief,
claimed to be the conversion relied upon here. Nor can it
be so claimed.
Let it be noted, in this connection, that one of the
individual defendants so charged in this complaint with
''selling and disposing of" liquor, is :Mr. Lack. He is appellant's vendor; and appellant has already, in this complaint, alleged a contract, (Ex. A) by the specific terms
of which he is required to sell, and thus also dispose of,
all this liquor.
It was his duty to sell it. That was the purpose for
which appellant delivered it to him, and it was what
appellant was paying him for doing. (R. 8)
Keeping in mind, then, the lack of any allegation
that the partnership ever possessed or engaged in selling
any liquor, and also the fact that the allegations refe,rring to Lack's conduct show that he was acting "pursuant" to the package agency agreement, not as a pharmacy partner, nothing can be claimed as against respondent, by merely including him individually by the use of
the plural "defendants," in connection with sales.
Since no wrong-doing is remotely indicated by the
allegation of sales, as applied to Lack, and he is alleged
to have engaged in the sales, how could a conversion
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arise as against respondent, by reason of the fact that he
might have joined or helped Lack in this rightful act, or
acts~ It seems that the most that could be taken as an
inference or presumption of fact would be that respondent helped Lack to do something which Lack had a right
and duty to do.
It is not alleged, or claimed, that the sales constituted a conversion, anyway. And a most conclusive elimination of any claim of conversion by this plural use
of "defendants," as to "delivery" or sale, is that appellant does not, either by this or any other allegation,
or by the points raised in its brief on this appeal, claim
a conversion by reason of possession or sales, wrongful
or otherwise.
In fact, the very next allegation departs from any
intention to claim a conversion of the liquor itself, or a
conversion by reason of the sale of it.
There the complaint (R. 3). states the value of part
of liquor so alleged to have been sold, and then says:
"for all of which the said defendant failed, neglected and refused to account to plaintiff and
that, THEREFORE, the said defendants wrongfully converted the value thereof, to wit: the sum
of $37,805.17 to their own use,* * *" (emphasis
ours.)
So, while the retail value is probably not the value
which could rightly be claimed for conversion of the
liquor by the respondent, under the general rule, the
amount Lack was required to remit upon sale by him
under his contract was the "retail value." (R. 8) And,
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11 ~
.u:

taking the ordinary Ineaning of this allegation and any
definition or use of the word "therefore," this clearly
says. that, by reason of defendants' failure to account,
said defendants "conYerted the value of" so much liquor
to their own m:'e. It then adds, and this is plainly correct, that it is this failurH to account for the "smn" due
the Commission that caused its alleged drunage.
This is the only tin1e "converted" is used in the complaint and this is the only thing alleged as a "conversion," therein.
Thus, from the facts alleged in this complaint, it is
plain that Lack is sufficiently charged with a claim,
at least for breach of his contract. This complaint say~
he has failed to do exactly what it recited in the contract pleaded, that he would do, in this respect, to protect appellant against this loss.
And for this, he gave the statutory bond. And so,
as appellant alleges (R. 8), it collected on this bond.
And so, too, all plainly understood that it all had to do
with the package agency businHss, not the drug store
business. But, this is not an allegation of conversion by
anyone, as we shall further show.
And respondent, by the complaint, had no duty "to
account" for all or any of the liquor received by Lack
from appellant "pursuant to this agreement." Failure
to account is not conversion, and there is no allegation
that respondent ever had possession of any "sum" or
amount of n1oney received from the liquor. And appellant does not claim liability on such basis.
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It does allege that, at the time of the failure to
account, Lack was appellant's partner in the drugstore
business. B~t yet, it is nowhere alleged, or intimated,
that this partnership, or this drug store, ever had possession or control of any of the liquor, or of any "sum"
of money from it, or ever "failed to account," or ever
"converted" anything.
The brief, in fact, seems to eliminate any possibility
of any claim or inference that the loss resulted from any
operation of the drug store, by the affirmative statement
that the loss was from the operation of the package
agency. It says (p. 4):
"This action was brought to recover the sum
of $37,805.17 which was lost to the State of Utah
'THROUGH THE OPERATION OF the Brigham
Street Pharmacy L I QU 0 R PACKAGE
AGENCY, in the years 1946 to 1948."
This mixing of the pharmacy name with that of the
liquor package agency designation seems to be another
attempt, by mere insinuation, to involve the partnership.
The contract plainly states how this agency shall be
designated. It says that it "shall be designated as Package Agency No. 78."
Before leaving this, we point out, also, that the above
quotation from their brief, as to this action, and as to
loss, does not claim the loss of any liquor, but alleges
sale of liquor and failure to account, and loss of a "sum"
of money, and recites that this action was brought to
recover such a "smn."
20
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On the same page of the brief (p. -1-), near the end
thereof, it again states the "yalne," as above quoted herein, and then says. "that this sum had been converted by
defendants.·· So that it is clear that there is no claim of
conYersion of liquor by the sale of it, or, in fact, at all.
So it is clear that the loss claimed was "through the
operation of" the "package agency," and by reason of a
"failure to account."
What Appellant Claims It has Alleged:

Before the argument, we will quote what the appellant, in its brief, claims it had alleged as a basis of clall:n
here.
Strikingly, although perhaps naturally, appellant
makes no mention of the first set of allegations above
referred to and analyzed by us. These are the elaborate
allegations constituting about four-fifths of its complaint, which amply show that it was "in the ordinary
course of the business" of the liquor package agency that
the loss really occurred.
Appellant, in its brief, (p. 9), says the "complaint
alleges":
1. "The existence of a parnership known as Brig-

ham Street Pharmacy."
2. Sets "forth * * * the delivery to the defendants at the Brigham Street Pharmacy of
liquor, the property of plaintiff." (This is the
whole $1,057,000.00 worth.)
3. "Furthermore, it has alleged the conversion
by the defendants of a portion thereof of the
value of $37,805.17."
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We have quoted and have tried fully to analyze
what actually has been alleged as to these matters, and
wherein the allegations are lacking. We will deal with
some law on the last of these claims, under Point I-A immediately, and with the law on the others more generally
under Point I-B later.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1-A

The complaint does not allege a claim because (a) "The
recital of a conversion, in the complaint (R. 3), is a conclusion of law, and is not supported, but is nullified, by the
specific facts alleged."

The foregoing analysis and the authorities cited
later under Point I-B will dispose, we believe, of every
possible. claim of liability against this respondent, except
such as may possibly be claimed by the general allegations of conversion under paragraph 3, as just above
quoted.
There is only the one mention of "converted" or
"conversion." This is in paragraph 7 of the complaint,
and seems to be the only thing to which this claim,
just quoted as No. "3," above, could refer.
It is our position that the foregoing deduction that
"defendants failed * * * to account to this plaintiff, and
that, therefore, the said defendants wrongfully converted
the value thereof," is a conclusion of law, which is not
admitted by our motion, and it is not supported, but is
nullified, by the detailed allegations of fact from which
it is deduced.
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The following authorities show that the rule is the
smne under the forn1er Code practice and the Rules of
Civil Procedure, and is to the effect that, where such
a conclusion is alleged a.s a deduction from facts alleged,
and the facts pleaded do not sustain the conclusion,
the facts pleaded are controlling, and the conclusion will
be disregarded.

1 Bancroft Code Pleading, Practice and Remedies
(1937 Ed.), p. 60, states the rule as follows:
"\vnere a pleading contains both general and
specific averments which are inconsistent, or
where there is alleged a conclusion and also
the facts frmn which it is drawn, and such facts
are inconsistent with and do not sustain the conclusion, the specific averments or special facts
are controlling, and the general allegations will
be disregarded as immaterial."
See, also, I d., p. 28, as follows:
"The Inere presence of a conclusion, if a logical deduction from facts alleged, will not render
a pleading insufficient. But a conclusion has no
greater force than the premise upon which it is
founded, and it is inadequate when it is unsupported by the recited facts upon which it depends."
This rule of pleading has been repeatedly recognized
in the Federal Courts under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which are the same as ours, on this.
For example, in DeLoach v. Crowleys, 128 F. (2)
378, (1942), it is said, at p. 380:
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"Under this rule a petition may be dismissed
on motion if clearly without any merit, and this
want of merit may consist in an absence of law
to support a claim of the sort made, or of facts
sufficient to make a good claim, or in the disclosure of some facts which will necessarily defeat
the claim."

Burns v. Spiller, 4 F.R.D. 299, aff'd. 161 F. (2) 377,
(App. D.C. 1947), certiorari denied 332 U.S. 792 (1947).
This case also illustrates the application of this rule
of pleading. Here, although the complaint contain'ed conclusions to the effect that the conduct of the defendants
was wrongful, unlawful, and malicious, the complaint
was dismissed because the facts set forth in support of
this conclusion failed to show that such conduct was, in
fact, tortious.
This rule of pleading is analogous to the principle
which has been consistently applied in the. Federal
Courts, that where a complaint alleges a conclusion
which, by itself, may state a cause of action, if other
facts are set forth which disclose a defense to the claim
asserted, the complaint cannot be sustained as against
a motion to dismiss. See, for example, Abram v. San
Joaquin Cotton Oil Co., 46 F. Supp. 969, 974 (1942),
(Statute of Limitations); Hartford-Empire Co. v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 47 F. Supp. 711, 714 (1942), (Statute of
Limitations and Laches); Hoover v. Lacey, 80 F. Supp.
691, 693 (1948), (Release of a Contract Claim).

Eddings v. Southern Dairies, 42 F. Supp. 664
(1942).
24
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This case inYolYed a suit under the Fair Labor
Standards . .:\.ct. In order for that Act to be applicable,
the e1nployee plaintiff n1ust have been engaged in interstate conunerce. The complaint alleged, generally, that
the employee was engaged in interstate commerce. ':J.1he
complaint went on further, however, and more particularly described the nature of plaintiff's duties.
It was held that the complaint must be construed
in the light of the particular facts alleged, which were

controlling, and, since those facts disclosed that the employee was not engaged in interstate commerce, the complaint was dismissed, despite the presence of a general
allegation, in the form of a conclusion, to the contrary.
The court said, at p. 665 :
"While the complaint in this cause alleges in
general terms that the plaintiff, and those for
whom he sues, are engaged in interstate commerce, the allegations so alleging must be taken
in connection with the other allegations of the
complaint where plaintiff attempts to particularize the duties of the employees involved in this
controversy, and to state in what manner they are
engaged in Interstate Commerce * * *."

Robbins v. Zabarsky, 44 F. Supp. 867 (1942).
This case is a suit for liquidated damages under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (29 USCA, Sec. 207). Under
Sec. 213 (b) of that Act, Sec. 207 did not apply to employees subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Comme·rce C01nmission, and employees were subject to the
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jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission
if their duties involved the safety of operation of interstate motor carriers.
While the complaint alleged, generally, that the Federal Court had jurisdiction of the case under Sec. 207,
it also alleged, more particularly, the duties of plaintiff as a mechanic, involved in repairing and servicing
the trucks and equipment. It was held that the general
allegations of jurisdiction were nullified by the particular allegations of fact indicating that plaintiff was subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The complaint was, therefore, dismissed.
At p. 869, the court said: .
"The plaintiff objects to dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the question
whether he is within the exemption should not be
decided on a motion to dismiss. I do not believe
that this objection is well-grounded. 'Failure to
state a claim,' Rule 12 (b), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 28 USCA, following Sec. 723(c), may
be due to setting up too many facts as well as too
few."
The court also said, at p. 870:
"It, therefore, seems that if facts are alleged
in the complaint which make it possible to determine whether the exemption applied, the legal
question of applicability of the exemption may be
determined on a motion to dismiss. Cases cited
by the plaintiff (citations omitted) * * * are distinguishable on the ground that there the allega-
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tions of the con1plaint were insufficient to enable
the court to detern1ine the question of law raised
by the n1otion to dismiss."
The court also said, at p. 870, in refutation of another argtm1ent, also here n1ade h)~ appellant (p. 9):
"I cannot agree with the plaintiff's further
contention that his allegations are insufficient to
justify the action here taken because the proof
1night show he was not within the jurisdiction
of the Interstate C01nmerce Commission. The
plaintiff's description of his job is sufficiently
minute to give an ordinary person a dear impression of the nature of his duties."
Additional authorities on this point might be cited
at length, but, as we find no exception to the rule as
stated, this would seem to serve no purpose.
We believe these dispose of any claim that direct
liability, or conversion by any acts or conduct of this
respondent, has been alleged. It seems that such is not
claimed.
Additional law, applicable to both Points I-A and
I-B, will be cited infra, under Point I-B.
POINT 1-B
"The claim of conversion, based on the theory of the
partnership relation of Lack with respondent in the pharmacy, is unsupported, and is unsound in law."

Except for the one or two references in plaintiff's
brief, and which we have thought might possibly be, construed as elaiming that it has alleged a direct conversion,
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all that is alleged or claimed is that this respondent is
liable, by reason of this partnership relationship.
Of course, the statement in the brief (p. 9) that "it
has alleged conversion," may well be intended, also, to
mean no more than that it has done this by alleging the
partnership relation, as this relationship is recited immediately before this statement.
In fact, it is plainly said (p. 5) : "The theory of
plaintiff is that where a conversion occurs in the course
of operation of a partnership, each partner may be held
liable * * * regardless of knowledge * * *." And, again
(p. 6) : "Plaintiff's position is * * * if one partner converted a portion thereof, then all partners may be held
* * * ;" and (p. 6) : "This theory is fundamental to plaintiff's position so far as defendant Athas is concerned."
This theory, alone, is argued in the brief. And,
since it is the only one on which any law is cited, it is
possible that we have been over-cautious in discussing
the point of any claim of direct conversion, at all.
In any event, the complaint is not based upon any
claim of misconduct by this defendant Athas, or any
claim of knowledge of any such. If such was intended,
it would have been easy to allege conversion against
him by the short form of complaint provided for by the
Rules, which would have carried an implication of possession by him and of knowledge on his part. But, appellant has elected to allege many facts, including these
as to this partnership, and its business, and to rely upon
a theory based thereon.
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There was apparently a reason and purpose, and
perhaps a conunendable one, in appellant's not claiming
conYersion by any act of this respondent himself. And,
also, in atten1pting this theory of vicarious liability,
which is now repeated throughout the brief (pp. 5, 6, 14,
15), and which rests upon C. V. Lack's conduct alone.

One reason probably is that no personal contact
by this defendant '"ith the liquor involved, and no knowledge by him as to the handling or disposition of liquor
by Lack could be proved, if it were alleged.
Another reason, we think it may fairly be assumed
for the State's hesitancy to allege that the loss of the
liquor described in this complaint was due to any conduct
of this respondent, is that such allegations would be entirely contrary to the whole history of this particular
liquor package agency, and the handling of this liquor
as heretofore publicly aired for some months, and as
established by the State in two recent cases.
This factual history, and the conclusions as to responsibility for this loss, was there presented to this
Court, on briefs presented by the Attorney-General and
the Assistant, who have prepared this pleading and appellant's brief here, in this case, or who have participated
in both.
These cases are: State v. Lack, 221 P. (2) 852 (decided August 26, 1950), and State v. Harries, 221 P. (2)
605.
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They dealt with this same liquor and alleged loss.
Witnesses testified in great detail as to what transpired
at the premises where. the appellant and Lack operated
this package agency. Many people were rnentioned as
participants, in different phases of the liquor handling,
but the respondent Athas was apparently never present,
or involved, or mentioned.
Because this has other bearing here, we will pursue
these cases a little further. It was stated (853) that
Lack's shortage amounted in retail value to $37,805.00.
This is the same dollar value as the loss alleged here. (R.
3).
(Incidentally, it is stated by this Court, as there established, that $10,888.00 of this shortage and loss occurred before Lack's drug store partnership was formed.
We merely wonder, in passing, how appellant would work
its partnership agency theory as to this.)
The opinion goes on to recite various criminal conduct and embezzlement, as charged against Lack, and
also his intent to defraud. It recites the concealing of
this shortage by "padding sales reports," also, the illegal
selling to clubs, and that a "burglary was faked" by him
to conceal his shortage.
The opinion says of him:
"Defendant was an agent of the State of
Utah to sell the liquor in accordance with the
liquor laws."
As to the quantity of liquor lost, it is again stated
in the opinion ( 613) :
30
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··To show the scope of the operation, we
ha':e roughly computed the sales n1ade to only
three of the clubs involved." These "three clubs
paid Lack at least $35,000.00 for whiskey."

As to responsibility for the alleged loss, we cannot
refrain fron1 quoting fron1 the opinion again ( 613) :
"That he (Lack) could operate and carry
on such a large volmne of business from a package
agency in such a notorious manner suggests either
participation by someone in the Enforcement
Division or unequaled laxity in upholding the
law."
So, as we have said, it is doubteful that appellant,
or its counsel here, would want to, or did, attempt to
allege or prove a factual story contrary to what they
established in these cases. But, appellant seems to feel
justified in attempting to attach a liability to this respondent, if this can be done, on a technical theory of
partnership agency alone; or feels justified, at least,
in putting that question up to the Court.
So, it argues, that because the·re was a partnership
1n the pharmacy, Lack's misconduct can be attributed
to this respondent, at least to the extent necessary to
establish liability to appellant for the loss of the proceeds from a portion of the liquor delivered to Lack, as
its agent, at the same general premises.
So, too, the allegations of the complaint here aptly
show again that Lack was, in fact, "an agent of the
State of Utah to sell this liquor in accordance with the
liquor laws." And, we think, the entire factual basis of
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appellant's claim, and its full claim, is, as we stated,
after careful analysis in the Lower Court, just this:
"Plaintiff claims by this complaint that, if
the Liquor Commission agrees with a person
to operate. a package agency as its vendor, and if
such vendor happens to be a 1ne1nber of a partnership which, at the same time, is operating a retail
drug store, and if such package agency is operated in a designated portion of the same premises in which said partnership retail business is
operated, then the partner in the retail business, because of his partnership relation therein,
is responsible for the default of the package
agency vendor, in failing to remit receipts from
sales made in his conduct of the package agency."
We may now add that this is the claim now presented, and relied upon, by appellant in this Court.
After the complete allegations showing the arrangements for, and the conditions of, delivery and handling
of this liquor business, and also the allegations showing
a different partnership line of business entirely, and
after noting the absence of any allegations or inference
or intimation that the partnership ever was intended to,
or that it ever did, engage in the business of handling
liquor in any way, it seems unnecessary to cite. authority
on this Point I-B.
It is true, of course, that if the liquor had been,
in fact, handled in the "usual course of business" of the
partnership, and if it had then failed to account for
part of it, both partners would be liable; but the complaint actually negatives any inference or intimation
that it was.
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It is fully alleged that the liquor business is the
busines:s of Lack and the appellant. It could not legally
be otherwise. And the business of the partnership is
also alleged (R.

~),

and liquor handling is not legally, or

at all, "appropriate to'' or within the scope of the "ordinary course or usages" of that business. Any pleaded
or inferable acts of Lack, pertaining to liquor, would
plainly be appropriate to and within the ordinary course
of that business, and would not be within the agency of
these partners.
See: Salt Lake Brewing Co. v. Hawke, 24 U. 199,
207; 66 p. 1058.
It is impossible to see how handling or selling of
liquor could be "in the ordinary course of the business"
of a drug store, when any such business conducted therein would be a crime. It certainly could not be presumed
to be in such ordinary course of business.
And this partnership could not have been in, or have
been dealt with in this liquor business, except in violation of the statute (46-0-82) which authorizes operation
of a package agency by a "natural person" only.
If the liquor frorn 1945 through 1948 had been
handled in the "ordinary course of the drug store business," of course, the Liquor Commission would, of necessity, have known of it, and this loss is strung out over
this whole period. The liquor delivered by, and not accounted for to, the Commission is only 3¥2% of that
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furnished to Lack at this agency. The other 96Y2% was
paid for after Lack "received and took possession" (R. 3)
of it.
The law and the contract, under which this liquor
business was operated, required that all the liquor
handled be furnished and delivered by the Commission
to Lack. And appellant alleges (R. 3) that it "performed all of the conditions and obligations on its part
to be performed."
The Commission collected over a million dollars
for this liquor, so delivered to and sold by him. It cannot be assumed or inferred that the Commission entered
into and engaged in all this business in violation of the
law, and we do not believe that any such is intended to
be alleged. This was never the "ordinary business" of a
drug store.
So it again comes down simply to what appellant
has argued in its brief, which is this: If a person, who
is an agent engaged in one line of business, is also
a partner in one or several other and distinctly different
lines of business, then everyone of his partners in every
other line is liable for any tort he commits in the "ordinary course" of the first business.
Or, stated another way, where a person is a partner
in one or more lines of business, and also operates one
or more businesses of his own, any partner of his is
liable for any tort that he may comrnit in the course of
his own business or businesses.
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'Ve agree that a

partner in a business, in the course
and furtherance of which a tort is committed by his
partner, 1uay be charged therewith, \vithout an allegation that he had knowledge of his partner's tortious
conduct.
But we confidently deny that he would be so liable,
unless he at least had knowledge that he was a member
in an existing partnership which was engaged in the
course of a business in which it is alleged the claim of
loss occurred.
This is the obvious weakness of appellant's contention here. It alleges that this partnership was one engaged in a legitimate business, which is universally and
by statute recognized as a distinct and different business
from the liquor business alleged, and in which this loss
occurred, and then it has to argue that Lack's misconduct
in the liquor business puts his drug store partnership
into that liquor business, and makes it liable for his
acts therein.
No authority can be found for such a position or
theory.
Appellant first cites (p. 8) 69-1-10 of the Utah Code.
This does not refer to conversion directly, but does state
that: "Where by any wrongful act or omission of any
...-:

partner, acting in the ordinary course of the business of
the partnership * * * loss or injury is caused to any
person * * * the partnership is liable therefor to the
same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act."
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Then, 69-1-11, which says that: uwhere the partnership, in the course of its business, receives money or
property of a third person, and the money or property
so received is rnisapplied by any rnanner * * * the partnership is bound to make good the loss."
The agency theory by which one partner binds
another applies only while a partner is "acting in the
ordinary course of the business of the partnership."
And 69-1-11, referring to a situation where the "partnership receives" money or property in the course of
its business, has no application here.
There is no allegation or claim that this drug store
partnership, either in "the course" of its business or in
any manner, ever received any money or property of
the plaintiff, or that anybody converted either of these.
One question is what is meant by "acting in the
ordinary course of the business of the partnership,"
and what is quoted as the test on this, in an Annotation
in 175 A.L.R., p. 1311, is the following from Am. Jur.:
40 Am. Jur., p. 261:

"Sec. 190. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR TORTS.

* * * The test of the liability is based on a determination of the question whether the wrong was
committed in behalf of and within the reasonable
scope of the business of the partnership."
The liability of a non-acting partner rests upon the
principle of agency. See:
47 C.J., p. 826.
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Jfechem on Aqency, Vol. 2, Sec. 1879.

In this section, this author points out, also, that "the
scope of the business," as applied in partnership ca.ses,
is a .. corresponding term" to that of "within the course
of his en1ployu1ent," as applied to an agent.
Jfechem, Yol. 2, Sec. 1960.

This section further points out that a principal may
be liable for even wanton or malicious acts of his servant,
if the servant were actually acting within the course of
his en1ployn.1ent, and in the execution of his authority,
and says:
"But, in general terms, it may be said that
an act is within the course of the employment if
(1) it be something fairly and naturally incident
to the business, and if ( 2) it be done while the
servant was engaged upon the master's business
and be done, although mistakenly or ill-advisedly,
with a view to further the master's interests, or
from some impulse or emotion which naturally
grew out of or was incident to the attempt to
perform the master's business, and did not arise
wholly from, some external, independent and personal motive on the part of the servant to do
the act upon his own account."
47 C.J., p. 837, Sec. 300.

This section also points out that an act by an individual, even though he be a member of a partnership,
if done "in his individual capacity and on his individual
credit as principal, it is binding on him only, even though
it accrues to the benefit of the firm."
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See, also, Lowenstein v. Whitelaw, et al. (Wash.),
34 P. (2) 1108, which case is cited in support of the above
quotation. There is no benefit to the firm claimed here.
40

Am. Jur., p. 261, et seq.

This work discusses the matter of a partner's liability, commencing with debts, and continuing through
torts, negligence, conversion, misappropriation, libel,
slander, malicious prosecution, and up to criminal conduct. The last of these will be discussed briefly later.
It is unnecessary to go into a discussion of all of
these. In each paragraph, and in all the works on agency
and partnership, it is emphasized that wrongful conduct,
to bind an innocent partner, must be in, and in furtherance of, a partnership business in which they are both
engaged. The facts alleged here do not come even close
to creating a partnership liability, or to bringing this
respondent within any rule of agency liability.
The complaint, in fact, affirmatively shows:
1. That this respondent was not even a member
of any existing partnership engaged in the
liquor business, in the operation of which this
loss occurred, at all.

2. The loss occurred in the conduct of a business
with which neither this respondent nor the
partnership of which he is a member had any
connection, at all. It is fully shown to be the
separate line of business of Lack and appellant.
3. Any wrongful acts by which the loss could
have been, or was, caused were not "commit-
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ted in behalf of and within the reasonable
8cope of the business of the partnership," but
\vere utterly foreign thereto.
It requires no further eitation of authority to establish that the 1nere partnership with a person does not
make one liable for any acts such person may commit.
The following cases go much farther than we are re-

quired to go here, in disposing of this contention and,
also, in disposing of any clailn of partnership liability
here.

Rouse v. Pollard, et al., 130 N.J. Eq. 304, 21 A. (2)
801, 136 A.L.R. 1105.

A member of a law partnership, acting for the firm,
was, at the same time, acting on his own account. He
was a member of the partnership firm sued. The firm,
acting by him, had handled a divorce matter for the
plaintiff. In the divorce settlement, the firm obtained
for her some $28,000.00. She turned this money over to
the acting partner.
By agreement with her, he took $350.00 of this as the
firm's fee, which it received. Then, pu;rsuant to her
instruction, he kept the balance of the funds to invest
for her, and, after paying her interest thereon for ten
years, and having returned $7,000.00 of the fund to her,
he absconded with the balance.
He had also represented to her that the firm was,
in fact, engaged in the business of investing the funds
of clients.
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The Court held that such was not a "characteristic
function of the practice of law" and, therefore, not
within the scope of authority or agency of one of the
partners. And that the partner, therefore, in making
such representation and receiving the funds involved,
was not acting within his authority, and that he did not
bind the partnership, nor was it liable. The opinion, and
the Annotation following it, cite additional cases.
Prairie Oil and Gas Co. v. Shanblum, 294 F. 894
(5 CC).
This case is cited by 47 C.J., p. 884, in support of
the statement that "the fact of partnership alone does
not rend~r one member liable for the torts of another."
In the case, there was a partnership for the buying,
selling, threading, and handling of second-hand pipe
and oil well supplies. The plaintiff brought the action
against the partnership, to recover for pipe stolen from
him, and which was purchased and disposed of by two
of the partners. The other two defendant partners did
not participate. as to this, and did not ratify or approve
the handling of the stolen pipe, and the Court held that
they were not liable to plaintiff.
Even though the Court said the partnership was
actually formed for handling the kind of product and
engaged in the same line of business that these two partners, so acting, were engaged in, the Court held that the
partnership to buy and sell did not include within its
scope the dealing in property known, by the partners
acquiring the same, to have been stolen.
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Here, as we ha.Ye above said, neither the conduct
of Lack. the business in which it occurred, or the product
handled, had any relationship to the partnership business.
See, also, Iron c. Sauve, 179 P. (2) 327 (Wash.
19-!7). ~-\.. t p. 330, the Court says :
"It is not enough for appellants to establish
an agency relationship; it must be established
that Haltern1an (the partner) was doing something in f'urtherance of the purpose for which
the relationship was created. In other words, it
n1ust be within the scope of the partnership."
The cases cited by appellant give no support to the
contention actually made here that this respondent is
liable by reason of his membership in a partnership
with Lack, in a separate business.
Each and all of these cases show that the conduct
of the acting partner was within the usual business of
the partnership and in furtherance thereof. For example, the Brokaw case cited and quoted from (P. 8) was
simply one where a brokerage firm engaged in the handling of securities received the securities of a client and
one of the partners converted them.
The Clark case cited from Colorado (P. 9), was one
that rested upon innkeepers' liability. The innkeeper
was a partnership and the law of Colorado made the
partners liable for money of a guest deposited with them.
The partner responsible for the loss of the money, the
opinion says, was acting within the ordinary scope of
partnership business.
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The Appellants, at p. 9 of their brief refer the Court
to an annotation in 67 Am. St. Rep. 38, and particularly
to p. 42 and 43 thereof. At p. 39 and 40, however, the
principles applicable to the instant case are set forth,
wherein the author says:
"A tort committed by one partner will not bind the
partnership or the other co. . partners unless it be authorized or adopted by the firm or be within the proper
scope and business of the partnership: (citations omitted). Hence, if the partner commits a tort, not as a

partner, but as an individual in respect to a matter
entirely foreign to the business of the partnership, the
other partners are not answerable for his wrong: (citations omitted)."
Again at page 41, the author says : "If one member
of a firm purchases cotton, which is liable for rent, and
such purchase is not made for the firm, but for himself
alone, and the cotton is converted to his own use, the
other partner is not answerable where he had nothing to
do with its conversion and received none of its proceeds:
Stokes v. Burney, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 219." See also p. 4.f,
where, after referring to the cases cited by appellant
at p. 42 and 43, the Court says: "On the other hand, if
money or property comes into the hands of a partner in
the course of some transaction unconnected with the
firm b1:1siness, his appropriation or mis-application thereof will not affect his innocent co-partners, where the
firm does not receive the benefit of the wrong: (Citations
omitted). Thus, if a promissory note is delivered to one
42
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member of a firm, as collecting agent, his refusal to
re-deliver the note does not make his co-partners answerable for the amount thereof. Linn v. Ross, 16 N.J.L.

55."
In Nisbet r. Patton, cited at p. 9 of appellant'8
brief, the Court 1nerely approved an instruction given
in the lower court.

That instruction clearly told the

jury that •·the defendants having, as partners in busi-

ness, received the notes for a particular purpose, they
were bound, when that purpose was accomplished, to
surrender the notes."
It does not appear that in that case the conversion
occurred in the course of an unrelated business activity
of one of the partners, and consequently that case does
not support the appellant's position.
It is Not Alleged that the Acting Partner was Acting
for the Partnership :

Appellant, in its brief (p. 9), makes the following
statement as to this partnership claim:
"Plaintiff, in its complaint, has alleged the
existence of a partnership known as the Brigham
Street Pharn1acy * * * Whether the disposition
of this liquor occurred 'in the ordinary course
of the business of the partnership,' we submit,
is a matter of proof, * * *"
So, first, we have an admission that this complaint
does not allege "any wrongful act * * * of any partner
acting in the ordinary course of the business of the
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partnership." As it clearly does not. Yet the only principle of law ( 69-1-10) cited or relied upon is in this quotation.
And, now, since the only allegation as to the partnership is tha.t one existed for another kind of business, and
since it is frankly stated in the brief (p. 4) that the loss
occurred "through the operation of the * * * Liquor
Package Agency," it affirmatively appears that liability
is claimed purely by reason of the existence of this partnership. In fact, in stating its "theory" and its "position" throughout its complaint (see PP. 5, 7, 13), appellant uses this language: "Where a conversion occurs in
the course of operation of a partnership, each partner
may be held."
This is not a statement of the law quoted and relied
upon, or a statement of sound law, at all. It is language
of confusion, which purposely avoids the related element,
"while acting in the ordinary course of the business of
the partnership." And, in view of the other allegations
and admissions, it can mean, and must be intended to
mean, only that, if a partnership exists and is "in course
of operation" at the time one partner therein causes a
loss, the innocent partner is liable. This, of course, is
not so.
And, also, "the disposition of this liquor" by Lack in
this package agency business was not a wrongful act,
under the law relied upon, either. Appellant had bound
him by an agreement to sell the liquor.
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~-\.nd,

furthennore, we have shown that such operation, in the handling of the liquor, could not be "in the
ordinary course of the business'' of the partnership operating "the Brighrun Street Phannacy."
And appellant, haYing pleaded the facts frmn which
it asks that its theory be deduced, is within the rule of
decision in the Federal Court of Robbins v. Zabarsky,
supra, wherein a motion to dismiss was granted, and the
opinion said :
"l cannot agree with the plaintiff's further
contention that his allegations are insufficient to
justify the action here taken because the proof
might show he was not within the jurisdiction of
the Interstate Commerce Commission. The plaintiff's description of his job is sufficiently minute
to give an ordinary person a clear impression of
the nature of his duties."

We simply add that the detailed description of the
liquor business here, and the allegation as to the business
of the partnership, are certainly sufficient to give an
ordinary person a clear picture of the nature of each
of these separate businesses. There certainly cannot be
any claim merely by reason of the physical proximity of
these two different kinds of businesses.
And, finally, when a plaintiff alleges detailed facts,
from which a theory of liability is claimed or asked to
be deduced, whether the theory of liability is sound or
unsound, the matter of proof must depend upon its relevancy to what has been pleaded. The rule, of course,
requires that the facts must state a basis of claim. But
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there is certainly no rule that plaintiff can prove the
basic facts in support of its claim because it has not
alleged such.
Further Reasons Why No Liability Is Alleged:

There are two matters of law to which reference
has been made before, in addition to those cited under
the foregoing points, and by reason of which this complaint fails to state a claim as against this defendant.
The sections of Ant. Jur., above referred to, as to
different acts by a partner binding an innocent partner
in tort, turn very frequently (as above pointed out by
Mechem, also) on whether the acting partner is really
engaged in furthering the business of the partnership,
or whether he has stepped outside, because of some
malice, or intent or purpose or "personal motive * * *
to act upon his own account."
We need not go into the detail of this, but call attention to the general rule that, where a partner engages
in the conunission of a crime, except in those cases
where the crime consists in the failure of the business
to acquire the necessary licenses, or do other things of
that character, the innocent partner is not generally
liable for the criminal acts of his partner. This is on
the theory, and we think that situation clearly prevails
in this case, that, in committing a crime, a partner or
agent steps into the field of his individual endeavor.
40 Am. Jur., p.

266:
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''See. 196. CRIMINAL AND PENAL LIABILITIES.-..:\ partnership relation in a lawful
enterprise will not render one partner liable for
the intentional cri1ninal act of another. The liability of the absent partner is based on the theory
of agency, but an agent's wanton criminal act
will not bind his principal."
Another 1natter to which attention has been previously directed, is the further reason why no conversion
at all is alleged in that there can be no such thing a.s
the conversion "of a value."
We have pointed out that In the only mention of
"converted" or "conversion" in the complaint, it is recited: "That said defendants wrongfully converted the
value thereof, to-wit: * * *".
A value is "that which is considered an equivalent
in worth." It is not, by any definition, tangible property
or personal property. It is not, therefore, capable of
conversion.
Money itself, and particularly if identified, may be
the subject of conversion. But there is no allegation that
any sum of money was ever received by the partnership
here, or by this respondent. Value would be somewhat
similar to a chose in action.
53 Am. Jur., p. 809:

"Sec. 5. CHOSES IN ACTION.-An action
will not lie for the conversion of a mere debt or
chose in action."
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"Sec. 4. INTANGIBLE PROPERTY.-It
has been declared that an action for conversion
lies for every species of personal property which
is the subject of private ownership; that the conception that an action for conversion lies only for
tangible property capable of being identified and
taken into actual possession is based on a fiction
on which the action of trover was founded, namely, that the defendant had found the property of
another, which was lost; and that such conception
has become, in the progress of law, an unmeaning
thing which has been discarded by most courts.
It is ordinarily held, however, that an action for
conversion lies only for personal property which
is tangible, or at least represented by or connected with something tangible, and not for such indefinite, intangible, and incorporeal species of
property as the good will of a business or a laundry route, or a permit to conduct business, or a
licensed market stall for transacting trade."
POINT II.
The Trial Court did not err in granting l'lespondent's
motion for a more definite statement, based on the ground
that the complaint "is so vague and ambiguous" that respondent "could not reasonably be required to frame a
responsive pleading," nor in dismissing .plaintiff's complaint for r,efusal to furnish a more definite statement, when
so ordered by the Court.

While the claim upon which appellant apparently
relies here, has become more certain by reason of concessions and statements of theory in its brief, the situation on this point must be considered as it was presented
to the Trial Court on the motion and complaint.
48
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We were there 1net with the problem of determining,
as to both causes of action, what theories of liability
might be asserted as against this respondent, and of
attempting to determine which of such theories n1ight
be legally sound.
We believe, the situation presented is this:
If appellant's basis of claim of liability is, as we
have stated and briefed it under Point I-B, then it does
not come within the principle of law solely relied upon,
and the Trial Court was right in sustaining our first
motion. A claim was not stated and if a claim was not
stated, as claimed under Point I, then this Point II need
not be further considered.
But, on the other hand, if appellant claims that its
theory of liability is not confined to the one point of
claim, or is not confined to the possible theories or claims
which we have attempted to discover and to refute under
Point I, then it should be conceded that its refusal to
furnish a more definite statement justified the decision
under this Point II. Rule 12 (e) requires that its complaint must be disposed of, if it so refuses.
Furthermore, there is no sense or reason or law,
and no law has been cited, for appellant's off-handed
brushing aside of both Rule 12 (b), as to stating a claim,
and also Rule 12 (e), as to a more definite statement,
with the mere assertion that something might be uncovered or found out under other later Rules, appropriate and applicable only after the formation of the
pleadings, and for other purposes.
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Rule 12(b) is intended to save the time and expense
of the courts and parties, by determining at the outse1
whether plaintiff has a valid legal claim.
Rule 12 (e) seeks to serve the same purposes, by
enabling the parties to get at something definite enough,
so that they won't be litigating in all directions. This
rule has particular application, as shown by the authorities herein cited, to pleadings of this character, where
detailed facts are set forth and several possible claims
suggested.
It is also very plain that our motion did not seek
"evidentiary" matters, as claimed by appellant. On this,
while we do not repeat our motion, we do ask the Court
to note (R. 16) that it seeks only for the theories or bases
of liability against respondent, who, as appellant states
(p. 11), was a "non-contracting partner." We were trying to get at something we could plead to, without having to speculate as. to all that might be claimed under
the two causes of action then alleged. The motion pointed out "details" desired as the Rule required.
.And, it seems to us that, if Rule 12 (e) is ever to
have the application intended, this was the place for it.
We agree that if the complaint sets forth "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief" (URCP 8(a), each averment of
which is "simple, concise, and direct" 8 (e) ( 1) ) , a motion
for a more definite statement, attempting merely to
compel the plaintiff to set out the evidentiary detail8
upon which that claim is based, may be denied.
50
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"\Ye also agree with Professor :Moore (2 Moore's
Federal Practice, p. 1651, 2d Ed. 1947) that "the true
test

i~

whether the pleading gives fair notice and states

the elements of the clai1n plainly and succinctly, and not
·whether as an abstract 1natter it states 'conclusions' or
'facts'."
In the instant case, however, it is clear that the complaint does not comply with the requirements of clarity,
brevity, and conciseness set forth in URCP 8 and, therefore, a situation is presented which calls for the application of URCP 12(e) to compel compliance with URCP

8.
Appellant begs the whole question when it says, at p.
14 of its brief, that a complaint complying with Rule 8,
URCP, is not subject to motion for a more definite statement. The issue is whether the complaint does comply
with Rule 8, and the discussion following will be directed
to pointing out that the complaint here considered does
not in any sense comply with URCP 8.
In the first place, this complaint does not set forth
plainly and concisely, or at all, any legal theory of liability of the defendant Athas. A complaint must, in the
first instance, in order to comply with UR,CP 8, set forth
a legal theory of liability in simple and concise language.
As eminent an authority as Professor Moore has thi:::;
to say about the necessity of setting forth a theory of
liability (2 Moore's Federal Practice, p. 1656, et seq.,
2d Ed. 1947) :
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"The Federal Rules have done away with the
narrow 'theory of the pleadings' doctrine. This
doctrine, applied in many code states, requires a
pleader to state a definite theory of his case, on
which theory he must win or fail. Under the
F'ederal Rules, on the. other hand, a party is not
'required to pick and stick to one theory of law
* * * only to find when he gets to trial that he
has chosen the wrong one.' Amendments may be
made during and after trial under Rule 15, changing the theory on which the case is brought, and
under Rule 54 (c) the party is to be granted any
relief to which he is entitled even though he has
not demanded it* * *."
"This does not mean, however, that a pleading should not indicate some legal theory on which
the pleader hopes to recover. As a practical
matter, a good lawyer will of necessity have one
or mo~re theories of law upon which he believes
his client is entitled to recover; if he cannot work
out any theory he is not likely to have much
success with his suit. True, the courts will go
very far in finding a basis on which to sustain
a pleading as against a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a clairn, but good practice demands that the pleader state his claim with simplicity and clarity in the first instance, rather
than set out a jurnble of unrelated facts and hope
that the court will work out his case for him.
Further, if the pleading is to give 'fair notice'
of the claim it will normally have to be bottomed
upon some theory supporting recovery. Indeed,
it has been argued that this is now the major
function of the pleadings, since the facts can be
better gotten at by discovery.
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"The courts haYe rerognized these considerations in a line of cases supporting the proposition
that the pleadings should indicate the theory
or theories on which the pleader relies. Judge
Leibell has stated it in this Inanner: 'Although
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure plaintiff's relief does not depend upon the theory of
action or actions whirh she adopts in her complaint, * * * in the interest of clarity and good
pleading, she should state the grounds upon which
her various causes of action depend. Not only is
such a statement necessary in order to present
defendant 1cith a complaint to which he can
readily prepare an answer, but also a proper
definition of the issues will greatly facilitate
futnre proceedings in the case, such as examinations before trial.' In this case the complaint,
in addition to violating other provisions of the
Rules, stated elements of a number of different
causes of action without any clear demarcation of
the legal theories on which plaintiff predicated
recovery. In another case the court was unable
to determine whether a cause of action was intended to be stated as an action for fraud, for
breach of contract or for conversion, and there~
fore dismissed the complaint with leave to amend.
Similar rulings have been made in other cases."
"This requirement that the pleader indicate
the legal theory of his claim does not, of course,
require him to pick one particular theory and
cling to it to the exclusion of all others. Under
Rule 8(e) (2) he may state the claim alternatively
or hypothetically in the same count or in separate
counts, and he will not be required to make an
election between inconsistent theories. And as
indicated above he Inay, within fairly broad lim-
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its, shift his position before or at the trial under
Rule 15, and even without amendment is entitled
to any relief justified by the evidence."
Another eminent authority, Judge Charles E. Clark,
who played an important part in the forxnulation of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (See 2 Utah Law Review
12, 19, note 19, 1950), has indicated in a unanimous
opinion by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals (Herman
v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 108 F. (2)
678, 682, ( C.A. 3rd 1939) that a complaint, subject to
"varied interpretations," such as the complaint in the
instant case, may be rendered more certain pursuant
to Rule 12 (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In addition to the cases cited in the previous quotations, see:

United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., Inc. et al.,
31 F. (2) 730 (D.C. M.D. Tenn. 1940):
"Upon due consideration thereof, the Court is of
the opinion that interrogatories as provided for under
Rule 33 are not considered as a preliminary step in the
formation of pleadings but may be utilized for the purpose of obtaining evidentiary matters, after pleadings
have been formulated; * * *"
"The Court is therefore of the opinion that the
proper method of obtaining . a more definite statement
of facts not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity, in the original complaint to enable defendant
to properly prepare his responsive pleading, is by a
motion for a more definite statement or for a bill of
54
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particulars under Rule l:.?(e), and this view has apparently been adopted by a large nmnber of courts throughout the country."
.Also, Hartman Elecf1·ical illfg. Co. v. Prime Mfg.
Co., 8 F.R.D. 510 (D.C. E.D. \Yis. 1949) : "The defendant, as well as the Court, .is entitled to know with reasonable certainty the basis of the plaintiff's claim for relief."
Also, Gulf Coast Tr estern Oil Co. v. Trapp, 165 F.
(2d) 343, ( C.A. lOth 1947), where the Court says, at p.
348:
"If the requisite allegations of a complaint
under Rule 8 (a) ( 2) are too general or indefinite
to apprise the defendant of the nature of the
charge leveled at hin1, or are insufficient to enable
him to prepare his defense, he may require of
plaintiff the additional information under Rule
12(e) by a motion for a more definite statement
of fact."
In the second place, if it is attempted to assert a
vicarious liability on the part of the defendant, as is
presumably so in the instant case (p. 7 of appellant's
brief), the defendant is entitled to know the basis of
such liability. That is, the defendant is entitled to know,
before he can "reasonably be" expected to file a responsive pleading, to what extent he allegedly participated
in or instigated the alleged acts resulting in liability,

or, if he did not so instigate or participate in the acts
alleged, whether, and to what extent, he ratified or
adopted those acts, or is otherwise liable for the same.
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A case in point, in addition to the cases previously
cited under Point II, is Picking v. Pennsylvania Ry.
Co., 5 F.R.D. 76 (D.C. Pa. 1946), wherein a railroad
company was being sued for damages for allegedly participating in a conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs of rights
guaranteed by USCA Const. Amend. 14, and subject
such plaintiffs to false arrest and imprisonment. It was
held that the defendant was entitled to a more specific
statement as to the manner in which the company adopted or instigated the alleged unlawful acts, and as to the
capacity or position of its agents taking such action.
In the third place, it would seem that the defendant
is entitled to know, if it is attempted to assert a conversion on his part, plainly and precisely, what property
was allegedly converted. A direct and concise allegation
to that effect is essential, not only in order that the
defendant may file a responsive pleading, but, also, in
order to enable the defendant to i~telligently avail himself of the discovery procedures provided by the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Having above set forth the law applicable to the
issue raised by the motion for a more definite statement, we next consider the application of that law to
the facts of the instant case.
The lack of any alleged theory of liability, we believe, is conclusively demonstrated by Para. 7 of the
complaint (R. 3) wherein it is alleged that the defendants
(meaning presumably defendant Lack and defendant
Athas) "failed, neglected and refused to account to this
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plaintiff, and that, therefore, the said defendants wrongfully converted the value" of what is contended to be a
subject of conversion. Note that there is not only completely lacking any allegation of the origin of any duty
to ''account to this plaintiff," but also in the previous
para. 6 (R. 3) the complaint specifically negatives the
existence of any such duty in that the liquor is alleged
to have been "received" by the defendant (i.e. defendant
Lack) ''pursuant to the terms and conditions of said
agreement, Exhibit A." And with respect to the agreement referred to, it is further alleged (Para. 4 R. 2)
"that in all instances the term 'vendor' as used in said
agreement referred to the defendant, C. V. Lack."
In short, it is alleged that the liquor was received
and possessed by defendant Lack pursuant to an agreement solely between plaintiff and defendant Lack, and
that, "therefore," the defendant Athas is liable in conversion because he failed to account for liquor which he
never received and for which he was never obligated
to account under the terms of the agreement referred
to.
We certainly think that the complaint was, therefore, so "vague and ambiguous" with respect to the
theory of this appellant that respondent could not reasonably be expected to intelligently respond to it by any
pleading whatsoever, and, moreover, that the complaint
did not give to this respondent "fair notice" of the
basis of any legal claim for re<lief. So, also, this respondent could not be compelled to resort to the discovery
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proVIsiOns (U.R.C.P. 26 to 37) of the Rules since those
provisions are appropriate only for ascertaining facts,
not theories.
Next, we consider the existence of any basis of
vicarious liability in the allegations of this complaint.
In paragraph 2 (R. 1) it is alleged that "the defendants * * * were partners, doing business under the
firm name and style 'Brigham Street Pharmacy'." In
paragraph 5 (R. 2) it is further alleged that "said defendants owned and operated said Brigham Street Pharmacy as partners and shared in the profits and losses
thereof." It has been pointed out that there is nowhere
any allegation whatsoever that the defendants were engaged as partners in a liquor package agency. Then it
is alleged (Para. 6 R. 3) that from 1945 to 1948, a quantity of liquor was "delivered to the defendants at the
Brighan1 Street Pharmacy," but that only the "defendant (defendant Lack) received and took possession of
the same" pursuant to the agreement previously referred to.
We think the sum of these allegations, intelligibly
construed, is to the effect that the defendants were partners in the retail drug business and the liquor was delivered at those premises to be used in the liquor package agency pursuant to an agreement solely between
defendant Lack and the plaintiff.
We fail to see how these allegations can be taken
as asserting any basis for a vicarious liability on the
part of defendant Athas whether in the operation or
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ordinary course of business of any partnership, whether
under the theory of defendant Lack as the agent of defendant

~\thas,

or whether on any theory of ratification

or adoption by defendant Athas of the acts of defendant
Lack. Certainly, then, this respondent, is fairly entitled
to enlightenn1ent in this respect.
Next, we consider the allegations pertaining to the
subject matter of the conversion. The allegation relating to this is set forth in Para. 7 (R. 3) to the effect
that the "defendants wrongfully converted the value
thereof, to wit: the su1n of $37,805.17." As heretofore
pointed out in this brief, since it is impossible to convert the "value" of· any thing, clarification is imperatively
required with respect to this allegation. Moreover, apart
from any theory of vicarious liability, there can be no
conversion unless it is alleged that the defendant Athas
was in the possession or control of something capable
of being converted. Any allegation to that effect is
wholly lacking in this complaint.
In conclusion, then, on this point, it is futile for this
appellant to attempt to place the burden on this respondent of defining all the issues that could be involved
in this case by any responsive pleading of his, in view
of the "vague and ambiguous" character of this complaint. Moreover, it is equally futile for this appellant
(p. 1-l of appellant's brief) to attempt to relegate this
respondent to the discovery procedures afforded by the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when such procedures
are rendered useless to this respondent because, by util-
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izing them, he can only be probing in the dark for thE
basis of the claim for relief attempted to be asserted in
this case. In short, recourse to either pleading or discovery by this respondent will be futile at any time before the position of appellant in this case is considerably
clarified.
CONCLUSION

This is not the ordinary case, dismissed on motion.
Neither is it one where there need be concern as to
whether injustice may result by appellant not having
had its day in court. It wants, only, the disposition of an
issue of law.
Appellant itself chose to present a limited theory of
liability, based on alleged agency only, and resting upon
misconduct of its own agent, which conduct has become
publicly well known. It pleaded facts which it does not
desire to change, and from which it claims a technical
liability may be deduced. It intentionally avoided raising any facts reflecting any theory of liability based on
respondent's individual knowledge or conduct.
It not only elected to present this limited theory, but
it also voluntarily elected to stand upon its complaint,
as to both motions of respondent, sustained by the Trial
Court, and appellant refused to amend, thus definitely
indicating, then and now, that it does not want to claim
liability upon any other basis nor furnish a more definite
statement, after being ordered to do so by the Court.
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Furthennore, it appears that justice, instead of
being prevented, is, in reality, served by the ruling of
the Court, independently of any n1ore technical merit of
the clain1 presented.
The allegations as to the liquor business show that
appellant's own neglect in discharging its statutory
duties as to strict control and supervision of many details of the conduct of its package agency allowed its loss
to occur. And, that its failure to require an adequate
surety bond for its protection, in the event of the failure
of its agent to account as he had agreed, also contributed
to such loss. True, this is all hind-sight now, but it indicates the injustice of this atten1pt to charge respondent
for the loss.
The complaint affirmatively also shows that this
agency operation was not a losing one, but was highly
profitable to appellant, in that $1,057,000.00 retail value
of liquor was delivered here, and that all, except $37,000.00 worth, was paid for. So that Lack paid to appellant $1,020,000.00 for liquor he sold.
The failure to account for $37,000.00 retail value, of
course, did not result in a loss of that amount, as approximately one-third of that would, under the statute
and practice, have been profit. Of the approximately
$25,000.00, therefore, lost, $4,000.00 was collected from
the Surety Company, as alleged (R. 3), reducing such
loss to a total of about $21,000.00, or less.
We think it is common knowledge, also, that on $1,020,000.00 retail worth of liquor accounted for, appellant
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made a profit of somewhere between $200,000.00 and
$300,000.00. Or, in other words, that its profit on this
venture was at least ten times the loss it is here complaining about.
In view of all the foregoing, it would appear to be
a gross injustice to attempt to take all this profit, and
then impose upon this respondent a total penalty and loss
of this amount, or any portion of it, since the loss was
plainly incident to the liquor business, which produced
the profit.
It is not anywhere intimated that he, or any business
that he was connected with, received one dime out of
this liquor business operation. The opposite is indicated
by the statement of appellant that its theory is that respondent is liable, even though there was no participation, or even any knowledge, on his part of any misconduct on the part of Lack.
On the merits, it would serve no purpose to repeat
our contention here, that the theory of liability is not
sustained and is not sound, and that the Trial Judge did
not err in granting both motions of the respondent. There
is no reasonable basis for contending that the Court
could have done otherwise.
We respectfully submit that the orders of the Trial
Court here should be affirmed.
MULLINER, PRINCE & MULLINER
Attorneys for Respondent.

C. E . .Athas
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